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Abstract 
This paper is a first attempt at documenting economic efficiency levels in Africa’s electricity distribution, their 
evolution and the sources of this evolution. The analysis is based on a sample of 12 operators providing services 
in the 12 countries members of the Southern Africa Power Pool. We focus on the changes in total factor 
productivity (TFP) of the largest operators in each country between 1998 and 2005. We then rely on a DEA 
decomposition to identify the sources of the changes in TFP. The results suggest fairly comparable levels of 
efficiency in the region and performance levels and evolution quite independent of the degree of vertical 
integration, the presence of a private actor or the main sources of energy supply. The analysis suggest that 
although the companies have not made significant improvements during the period of analysis in using their 
capital and human assets, they have done much better in adopting better technologies and better commercial 
practices. No clear correlation could be associated with the adoption of reforms during the last decade and data 
limitations impede a more refined assessment of the impact of reforms on efficiency at this stage.    
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1. Introduction 
For over 20 years now, most Sub-Saharan African countries have lacked the ability to raise the 
resources needed to finance their investment needs in electricity—or in any other infrastructure sector 
for that matter. To try to generate the financing needed, close to 60% of the countries of SSA engaged 
during the second half of the 1990s in some type of reform of their power sector.2 But these reforms 
were not just intended to generate new financing options for the sector. They also aimed at improving 
efficiency. Indeed, in a region in which the sector has tended to have higher than average costs, 
improving efficiency significantly would also induce a significant drop in the financing requirements 
of the sector. 
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a first assessment of the performance changes since 
the main reforms took place in the late 1990s for a sample of Sub-Saharan African countries. The 
assessment is conducted the way an economic regulator would do it in preparation for a tariff revision 
under incentive based regulatory regimes.3 The approach is now quite common in Europe and Oceania 
among energy, telecoms and water regulators.4 It is in fact quite widely spread around the world in the 
context of performance benchmarking exercises.5  
The poor quality of data may be why relatively little work has been done on the efficiency of 
infrastructure services in developing countries. Sticking to energy, the only developing countries in 
which efficiency measures of some type have been assessed formally or informally as part of 
regulatory processes are in Latin America.6 To our knowledge, this paper is in fact the first effort to 
generate this type of assessment for a set of African countries.7 
The analysis covers the 1998-2005 periods and focuses on twelve countries around the Southern 
African Power Pool (SAPP). SAPP was created by Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) in 1995. The pool includes for now Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. The region is dominated by the state owner utility of South Africa, ESKOM which 
generates about two thirds of the electricity produced in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa and about 
80% of the output for the Southern Africa power community. ESKOM is indeed a major provider to 
many of its neighbours (Botswana, Congo, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe) through a wide transmission system. Zambia is the second largest exporter in Africa but 
relies mostly on hydro plants. In fact all countries but three in our sample rely at least partially on 
hydro sources although one of the exception is the largest player in the region, South Africa’s 
ESKOM. 
                                                          
2 For details on the level and types of reform, see Estache and Goicoechea (2005a and b). 
3 One of its interests is that, when conducted properly, it manages to ensure that consumers get to share some of 
the improvements in the performance of the sector that results from reform or simply from technological change. 
In other words, measuring efficiency in regulated industries ensures that not all performance improvements 
simply become a rent for monopolies. 
4 The British water and energy regulators were the leaders. They were later followed by the energy regulators of 
many of the Australian states as well and Nordic energy regulators in Europe. More recently by the Dutch 
Electricity regulators has been the first in continental Europe to adopt efficiency measures as part of its 
regulatory instruments.  
5 See Jasmab and Pollit (2001) for instance for an overview on the use of benchmarking in electricity regulation. 
For a survey of experiences and issues, see Coelli and Lawrence (eds) (2006), 'Performance measurement and 
regulation of network utilities', Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, forthcoming. 
6 For a survey of efficiency measures available for infrastructure activities in developing economies, see Estache, 
Perelman and Trujillo (2006). 
7 There is however a paper by Plane (1999) on Ivory Coast’s experience. 
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All the countries covered by our sample have undertaken some reform in their power sector 
since 1997 or so. Some have opened generation to competition. About a third has signed management 
contracts for at least some segments of the business and all have at least corporatized the business. All 
countries maintain a tight control over the distribution services and most of the countries have 
vertically integrated companies—with two exceptions as discussed later. 
The paper provides a comparative assessment of economic efficiency levels as well as of the 
sources of differences across companies observed during an 8 year period ending in 2005. We estimate 
the productivity change using a Malmquist Total Factor Productivity (TFP) index and decompose the 
total change by relying on a non-parametric (DEA) framework outlined by Färe and Grosskopf (1990) 
and Färe et al. (1994).8 We also decompose the changes into the catching-up and the frontier shift 
effects to get a sense of how much effort some of the operators are making to catch up with best 
practice in the region. Finally, we unbundle the catching up effect into  technical efficiency and scale 
efficiency which gives a sense of the extent to which the efficiency gains are achieved purely from 
changes in input mix or from better adjustment of the size of production to the demand.   
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the countries covered by the 
sample and the reforms that have taken place in the region. In section 3 we present the methodology 
followed in the paper. Section 4 discusses the variables available to reflect outputs and inputs.  Section 
5 provides a snapshot of what partial performance indicators reveal. Section 6 provides the main 
results on the full efficiency assessment. Section 7 concludes.  
2. Electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Africa enjoys some of the most significant potential fuel reserves in the world and yet its 
population suffers from one of the lowest electricity access rates. These access rates have generally 
managed to catch up with population growth during the 1990s but not much more. Access remains 
very low, 24% for the region. This is significantly lower than in other regions of the developing world 
where it is between 60% and 90% elsewhere, except South Asia where it is around 33%.9 Moreover, 
the biases in access rates continue to favor urban and rich households—urban and rural areas have, 
respectively, average access rates of 50% and 10%—with about 67% of the population still living in 
rural areas.  This echoes differences in relative demand by rich and poor, and urban and rural, users.  
Regional energy trade, particularly electric power, is a high priority for the SADC-member 
countries as a way to reduce the disparities in access to energy resources and consumption. A 1995 
Inter-Governmental Agreement creating the SAPP is a sign of the region's commitment to this 
integration. It is also expected to reduce energy costs and improve supply stability for the region's 12 
national utilities: Botswana Power Corporation (BPC); Electricidade de Mocambique (EDM); 
Angola's Empresa Nacional de Electricidade (ENE); Electricity Supply Commission of Malawi 
(Escom); South Africa's Eskom; Lesotho Electricity Corporation (LEC); Namibia's NamPower; 
Swaziland Electricity Board (SEB); the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) Societe Nationale 
d'Electricite (SNEL); Tanzania Electric Supply Company (Tanesco); Zimbabwe Electricity Supply 
Authority (ZESA) and Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO).10  
                                                          
8 Malmquist indices have been used to measure efficiency changes in other regulated infrastructure services such 
as for water distribution, railways and port services. For a recent survey, see Jasmab and Pollit (2001). 
9 Details are available in Estache and Goicoechea (2005a). 
10 SAPP membership is presently restricted to national electricity utilities, although Hidroelectrica de Cahora Bassa (HCB) 
was granted temporary observer status to the three SAPP Sub-Committees (Planning, Operation and Environmental) in April 
1998. At that time a moratorium was declared prohibiting any other non-utility members from joining while the SAPP 
considers the role in the region of Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and Independent Transmission Companies (ITCs), as 
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 Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the current market structure of the countries 
covered by the sample. Although all countries except Angola and Namibia, have vertically integrated 
companies, the market structure of the sector vary significantly across countries. There are clear 
differences both in terms of technology and coverage. While most countries rely on at least some 
significant hydro sources, the largest producer, South Africa, is definitely mostly thermal—it is also 
the only one in Africa to have nuclear generation. In addition, to get a glimpse at the demand side, 
Table 1 shows that the spread of access rates is very significant across the region at the beginning of 
this new century but most are below 20%.  
As of 2006, Southern Africa's total installed electric generating capacity was about 53,000MW 
(although the net generation output is only around 45,000MW).  The region is getting very close to 
exhausting its reserve capacity according to various demand growth scenario being discussed in the 
region. The largest electricity generator by far was South Africa (about 80%), followed by DRC, 
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. These countries are also the largest consumers of electricity.  
Eskom is a major supplier to many of South Africa’s neighbours.  This makes for a somewhat strange 
characterization of the supply sources in the region. Indeed, while most countries rely on hydro 
sources when possible (and the potential is very far from being tapped), the strong role of Eskom as a 
supplier implies that the actual source of energy for many of the smaller countries is actually thermal. 
Around 74 percent of South Africa's electricity supply comes from coal-fired power stations. Africa's 
only nuclear power plant is also located in South Africa, supplying electricity to the Western Cape 
Province.    
The experience in implementing reforms is just as diversified as the technological and coverage 
experience in this sample. The commitment to reform in the region was launched in 1997 when South 
Africa announced it would create 5 regional electricity distribution companies (REDS) which would 
be joint ventures formed by ESKOM and local authorities in the various countries. The REDS were 
expected to purchase electricity from ESKOM generation and IPPS on the basis of tariffs set by the 
National Electricity Regulator. The first private actor was AES when it entered the country in 2001. 
Malawi and Tanzania have also entered into management contracts with private operators and a 
number of other countries are now preparing similar reforms. Generation is now competitive, at least 
partially, in about half of the countries covered by the sample. About half of the countries now count 
an independent sector regulator. 
The upshots of this brief overview are that (i) Africa operators have to address major supply 
gaps and (ii) any reduction in the financing costs of the expansion requirements that can be achieved 
from improvements in efficiency is likely to be welcome by a region which includes some of the 
poorest countries in the world. Efficiency measurement is thus an important regulatory tool which 
should be also of interest to the Ministers of Finance of the region since good measurement will 
eventually lead to significant cost savings in the countries starting from poor initial performance 
levels.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
well as implications of future utility scenarios such as unbundling and privatization. 
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Table 1: Electricity Sector Reform in Selected SSA countries 
Country Operator in 
distribution 
Competition 
in generation 
Private role in 
distribution 
Sector 
regulator  
Vertical 
integration 
Main 
electricity 
source 
Electricity 
access rates 
(% in 2005) 
Angola Empresa 
Distribuicao 
Electricidade 
(EDEL) 
Yes 
(2003) 
No 
 
No No 
D – EDEL 
G and T –ENE 
T 20 
Botswana BPC No No No Yes T + I 37 
DRC SNEL No No No Yes H 6 
Lesotho LEC Yes Yes Yes Yes H+ I 11 
Malawi  ESCOM No Yes 
Management 
Contract  
(SA’s TSI) 
(2001) 
Yes Yes H 7 
Mozambique EdM Yes Yes 
Management 
Contract  and 
small contracts 
Yes 
 Advisor 
(2000), 
Regulator 
(2004) 
Yes  
but 2 more 
firms in G 
H + I 6 
Namibia 4 Regional 
electricity 
distributors  
(2002) 
Yes Yes Yes  
( 2000) 
No 
 horizontal and 
vertical 
unbundling 
H + I 34 
South Africa ESKOM Yes No Yes 
 (1995) 
Yes 
 but many 
small D firms   
T  70 
Swaziland SEB Yes No Yes 
(2002) 
Yes H + I 
 
27 
Tanzania TANESCO Yes Yes 
Management 
Contract 
(NetGroup) 
(2002) 
No Yes H  11 
Zambia CAPC + 
ZESCO 
Yes Yes Yes 
(1999-2000) 
Yes  
but 2 big firms 
H  19 
Zimbabwe CAPC + 
ZESA 
Yes No No Yes  
but 2 firms 
H + I 27 
Note: Tr=Transmission, G=Generation, D=distribution, H=Hydro, T=Thermal, I=Import 
Source: author compilation from various sources (with a heavy reliance on the SADC website) 
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3. Methodology 
One of the major challenges in assessing the potential efficiency of a sector, in particular for 
regulated industries, is the need to identify indicators which reflect the fact that operators tend to rely 
on a combination of inputs (e.g. labor, various types of equipment and other intermediate inputs) 
which can have varying relative importance across these operators. Moreover, many operators offer 
multiple outputs as well (distribution, supply, service assistance, etc.). Productivity measures thus 
need to account jointly for the multiple outputs (say M) and inputs (say K) used in the production of 
these outputs. This is what Total Factor Productivity (TFP) measures are intended to do. Since not 
every output has the same importance for any given operator and since the relative importance of 
every input for every output type can differ, the general formula for TFP is written as: 
∑∑=
==
K
1k
kk
M
1m
mm XbYaTFP ,           (1) 
where the am and bk are weights and their choice is, as discussed later, quite important in 
practice.  
While, from an economic policy perspective, this approach is an improvement over partial 
productivity indicators typically used in engineering assessments, it is not problem free. The first 
problem is that the output weights and input weights have to each sum to one, a basic property of any 
TFP measure. To meet that requirement, the standard practice has been to work on the assumption that 
output and input markets achieve productive efficiency—i.e. output price=marginal cost and input 
prices=marginal product value) so that the weights are estimated by output and input share in total 
revenue and cost respectively.11 But these are strong assumptions for regulated industries which is why 
these simple weights are often subject to strong criticisms in the context of regulated industries and 
alternative solutions need to be explored. 
A second problem is that the index ignores that productivity improvements can result from 
technological changes but also from changes in behaviour due to the restructuring process or the 
design of the regulatory regime. From the viewpoint of a reforming government, it is important to be 
able to assess performance changes reflect the extent to which an operator catches up with best 
practice in the field for a given technology. In particular, it is important to be able to assess the 
capacity to achieve a given level of output at the minimum input use (if the regulator imposes the 
output levels on the operators and follows an input orientation in the definition of its efficiency 
concept).  This is the relevant question because in countries, output targets are the norm (i.e output is 
exogenous) and input choice is endogenous. This concern implies that the contribution of the technical 
efficiency of the operator needs to be isolated from the other sources of changes in TFP such as scale 
economies which can be driven by demand consideration independent from any sector specific reform.  
To be able to incorporate these various sources of efficiency changes while recognizing the 
limitations of the assumptions used in the simple index discussed above, it is now relatively standard 
practice to adopt a Malmquist index approach.   The Malmquist TFP index measures the TFP change 
between two data points by calculating the ratio of the distances of each data point relative to a 
common technology.  The Malmquist (input-orientated) TFP change index between period 0 (the base 
period) and period 1 (using period 1 technology as the reference technology) is given by (1). 
                                                          
11 This is what the Tornqvist index proposes.  
 7
( )
( )111
001
01 X,YD
X,YDTFP/TFP = ,            (2) 
where Dt(Xs,Ys) represents the distance from the period s observation to the period t technology.  A 
value of the ratio in equation (1) greater than one will indicate a TFP improvement.  For example, a 
value of 1.025 corresponds to a 2.5% increase in TFP.  
 The initial popularity of this indicator among regulators and other users of productivity 
measures stems from the fact that this index avoids having to work with input and output prices and 
the related output and input market clearing assumptions. It relies on output and input weight 
estimated directly. In addition, from the viewpoint of regulated industries where many of the 
productions decisions in terms of timing and levels are driven by the regulatory framework and 
various types of obligations rather than only self-centred rational behaviour by the operators, the index 
has the advantage of not requiring the need to work with behavioural assumptions for these operators 
(e.g. profit maximization or cost minimization). Finally, the Malmquist index makes it easy to 
compare the catching-up effort with the frontier shift for a given sector or operator. 12 
The approach we follow here is an improvement by Färe et al. (1994) over the Malmquist index.  
It is the geometric mean of two Malmquist indices, one evaluated with respect to period 1 technology 
and the second with respect to period 0 technologies. This approach has the advantage of avoiding any 
bias due to the choice of the technology of reference. Doing these yields: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
5.0
110
000
111
001
01 X,YD
X,YD
X,YD
X,YDTFP/TFP ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=  (3) 
An equivalent way of writing this productivity index is  
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
5.0
110
111
000
001
111
000
01 X,YD
X,YD
X,YD
X,YD
X,YD
X,YDTFP/TFP ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=  (4) 
where the ratio outside the square brackets measures the change in the input-oriented measure of 
technical efficiency between periods 0 and 1, we can call the Total Technical Efficiency Change 
(TTEC) which provides some insights on how much any company if catching up with better 
performing companies.13 The remaining part of the index in this equation is a measure of technical 
change (TC) which tells us how much the production frontier is shifting.. That is:  
TFPC = TTEC×TC  (5) 
To be able to isolate the scale economy effects, we follow the suggestions by Färe et al (1994) 
to generate a further decomposition of equation (5) which implies a constant return to scale (CRS) 
technical efficiency change measure (TTEC). This measure can indeed be decomposed into a “pure” 
technical efficiency change component and a scale efficiency change component. This is done by 
introducing variable returns to scale (VRS) distance functions, to obtain 
                                                          
12 See Nishimizu and Page (1982);Grifell and Lovell (1993). 
13 “Farrell” measures of efficiency correspond in each case to the expansion, or the reduction, of the ray that pass 
through the origin. It makes reference to the Farrell’seminal paper (Farrell, 1957). 
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where the V and C superscripts refer to variable returns to scale (VRS) and CRS technologies, 
respectively.14  Equation (5) thus gives a technical efficiency change (TEC) measure, a scale efficiency 
change (SEC) measure and a technical change (TC) measure.  That is: 
TFPC = TEC×SEC×TC (7) 
This is the decomposition looked for in this paper. It is particularly interesting in the electricity 
sector because it is not uncommon to have firms operating with technical efficiency (using the lowest 
possible level of inputs for a given level of production) but not enjoying the appropriate scale level (it 
is either too small or too big). In that case, there is not much the operator can do in the short run at 
least and it would be unfair for a regulator to penalize the operator for this scale issue because there is 
little it can do to cut costs further.  
 To actually generate the TFP index and its decomposition, we need to estimate the frontier from 
which the distance will be measured. Because of data constraints, we do so through data envelopment 
analysis (DEA), the non-parametric programming method.15  It allows the derivation of estimates of 
relative efficiency levels for each operator.  
 As seen in the formula, six distance functions must be calculated: 4 defined under constant 
returns to scale (CRS) and 2 under variable returns to scale (VRS). Equation (8) is one of the standard 
ways of presenting the underlying optimization program used in this paper:  
Min  θ0  
s.a.  Yλ ≥   Y0 
 θ X0 - λX  ≤   0                                                     (8) 
 λ ≥  0 
where λ is a vector describing the percentage of the other operators used to construct the efficient 
operator, X and Y are the inputs and output vectors of the efficient operator and  X0 and Y0 are the 
inputs and outputs of the operator under evaluation. The value of  θ reflects the efficiency of this 
operator.  
 
                                                          
14 This decomposition has been criticized by some authors because it measures technical change against the CRS 
technology instead of the VRS technology. Various alternatives have been proposed, however none of them are 
yet to gain widespread acceptance. See Grifell and Lovell (1999) and Balk (1999) for discussion on this issue.  
15 For more details, see Coelli et al. (1998, 2003a y b) 
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4. Which outputs and inputs should the efficiency analysis focus on? 
The poor level and quality of economic data on infrastructure in general is common knowledge. 
It is probably more dramatic for Africa than for any other region of the world. The creation of regional 
energy regulators associations (such as AFUR which covers the whole continent or RERA for the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries covered here) and the efforts of 
research centres (such as AFREN based in Kenya) have all contributed to the generation of a 
reasonably reliable set of data for a number of countries in that part of Africa. Their efforts make the 
analysis provided in this paper possible. 
The main challenge is thus to make the most of the information available. This means that 
pragmatism will often rule over strict theory in the assessment conducted here, as is often the case in 
“real world” regulatory assessments of efficiency changes. While the theory would argue for a detailed 
structural model accounting for all possible factors, pragmatism implies that the best one can hope to 
achieve in practice is to estimate a single equation function.  
With this pragmatic approach in mind, the first issue is to decide which output and inputs to 
focus on. Jasmab et al. (2004a and b) provide a detailed description of the ideal set of variables to be 
considered. Trying to be pragmatic, for outputs, we follow Neuberg (1977) who argues that we should 
at least consider both the number of customers served and total energy sold qualify as potential outputs 
in this sector. Note that energy delivered to final customers is not really exogenous, especially if some 
of the utilities are not well regulated. That is, the utility is not always compelled to provide its 
customers with whatever quantities they desire at given prices. Number of customers, on the other 
hand, cannot be controlled by utilities since in general everybody has the right to be connected to the 
national local distributor.  
We add generation to the Neuberg (1977) list of outputs simply because it has the advantage of 
being a relatively well measured product of these mostly vertically integrated operators. Given that 
technical and commercial losses can be quite important and given that some of the sales are based on 
imported energy for some of the countries and some include the results from exports, this variable 
provides a perspective not covered by sales or number of customers.  
 For inputs, once more we follow the standard practice. The number of employees is the 
standard labor input and is relatively easily obtained. As for the capital inputs, the options are more 
complex. Installed capacity is widely accepted as a required variable and has been used to approximate 
(Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson, 1998).  
The data used here is however not perfect. In many countries, conflicts and other dramatic 
events have resulted in a significant deterioration of the installed capacity. The use of this proxy may 
thus be overestimating the actual stock of capital available. For instance, in Angola, the available 
capacity is only about 60% of the installed capacity. Table 2 provides a summary of the data on the 
twelve Southern African electricity firms for the sample. Furthermore, the data on clients does not 
really allow us to distinguish between large and small clients which is often a relevant dimension, in 
particular when scale economies need to be considered.  
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Table 2. Summary statistics for the full sample 
 
A few additional basic facts on the evolution of the sector in recent times are relevant to the 
analysis conducted in this paper. The first is that the outputs variables we are focusing on have seen 
some significant improvement during the period under analysis. The number of formal clients in the 
region has indeed increased significantly, with about 51% more clients over a 7 year period. This is 
matched by an increased in sales and generation of 22% and 23% respectively. But this hides a wide 
variety of experiences. In generation for instance, SEB and EdM stand out with a drop of 47% and 
40% while, at the other extreme, ENE enjoyed an increase of 101%. The importance of drought for 
hydro sources is one of the factors clearly but the political instability seems to be a significant 
determinant of these fluctuations. 
 On the input side, employment has dropped by about 11% on average. The range is however 
wide. Some of the operators have seen employment increase such as BPC with an increase of 25% 
while others have seen it drop, such as Tanesco and Eskom with a drop of 31% and 20% respectively. 
For BPC the explanation may be the 127% increase in the number of clients and the need to address 
the rural electrification goals. For Tanesco, the drop is related with the adoption of a management 
contract with a private operator in 2001 which is associated with a 31% drop in employment. Finally, 
for Eskom, the adjustment took place largely between 1998 and 2001 and, in view of its size; we could 
not reject the assumption that the reduction in employment could simply be reflecting an improvement 
in scale economy. However, it could also be reflecting increased outsourcing which is not recorded in 
the standard statistics.  
In contrast to what happened to average employment, the capital input has increased by an 
average of 6%, although in this case as well the diversity of experiences is quite wide. Tanesco has 
increased its capacity by 42% while EdM only by 9%—dropped by 17%mostly from 2001 to 2004, 
during the civil war but its capacity has increased between 2004 and 2005—and the other operators 
has essentially maintained their capacity. 
5. What do partial performance indicators reveal? 
Before getting to the results of the TFP analysis, it may be helpful to get a first sense of the 
performance of these operators from the partial productivity indicators. The conclusions derived from 
these partial indicators will later be compared to those derived from the TFP calculations. These 
partial indicators are summarized in Table 3. It reports the ratio of each output (sales, generation and 
customers) to each input (labor and capital). 
Table 3 shows that the South African company Eskom enjoys the highest productivity of labor 
Outputs Mean Maximum Minimum Standard Deviation 
Generation (GWh) 19,306 221,985 102 55,024 
Customers (number of) 453,310 3,758,569 2,219 879,350 
Sales (GWh) 18,378 207,921 266 51,667 
Inputs Mean Maximum Minimum  
Installed Capacity (MW) 4,157 42,011 50 11,313 
Labor (number of workers) 5,505 37,311 345 8,281 
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both in 1998 and in 2005. Measured with respect to capital, the highest productivity is obtained by 
BPC when the indicator is generation/capacity but when sales/capacity is utilized SEB is the best in 
1998 and BPC in 2005. In general, SEB performs well with respect to capital in terms of all the 
indicators except for generation/capacity. This is due to the fact that SEB has only a modest capacity 
and relies heavily on imports to meet its demand. Finally, in terms of customers/capacity indicator, 
EdM is the best performer and does so with small clients, as indicated by the sales/clients ratio. 
NamPower is also a top performer when considering generation/customers indicator because its trades 
mainly with bulk suppliers.  
Table 3: Partial Productivity Indicators 
S/L G/L C/L S/K G/K C/K L/K S/C G/C S/G 
Year Utility (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
1998 ENE (Angola) 35 45 2,747 169 220 13,301 484 1 2 77
1998 BPC (Botswana) 89 54 4,036 1,120 683 51,058 1,265 2 1 164
1998 SNEL (DRC) 60 82 4,052 140 191 9,438 233 1 2 73
1998 LEC (Lesotho) 77 79 5,351 502 511 34,830 651 1 1 98
1998 ESCOM (Malawi) 36 47 3,246 330 426 29,612 912 1 1 77
1998 EdM (Mozambique) 32 9 6,653 415 114 87,340 1,313 0 0 364
1998 NamPower (Namibia) 230 161 281 461 323 565 201 82 57 143
1998 ESKOM (South Africa) 460 491 6,872 430 459 6,431 94 7 7 94
1998 SEB (Swaziland) 95 27 4,576 1,390 388 66,632 1,456 2 1 358
1998 TANESCO (Tanzania) 26 30 5,294 308 356 62,804 1,186 0 1 87
1998 ZESCO (Zambia) 157 192 4,172 394 481 10,473 251 4 5 82
1998 ZESA (Zimbabwe) 143 96 6,138 518 350 22,323 364 2 2 148
1998 MEAN 276 289 158 416 436 8,785 151 5 5 95
          
Year Utility           
2005 ENE (Angola) 43 62 3,387 247 356 19,320 570 1 2 70
2005 BPC (Botswana) 124 47 7,305 1,957 740 115,715 1,584 2 1 264
2005 SNEL (DRC) 74 110 5,749 191 283 14,755 257 1 2 67
2005 LEC (Lesotho) 81 102 10,518 492 619 64,129 610 1 1 79
2005 ESCOM (Malawi) 40 49 5,625 340 413 47,368 842 1 1 82
2005 EdM (Mozambique) 44 5 11,404 561 63 145,321 1,274 0 0 890
2005 NamPower (Namibia) 334 186 382 757 422 866 227 87 49 179
2005 ESKOM (South Africa) 700 747 12,656 495 528 8,947 71 6 6 94
2005 SEB (Swaziland) 128 16 7,271 1,672 203 95,098 1,308 2 0 824
2005 TANESCO (Tanzania) 52 76 11,342 304 438 65,657 579 0 1 69
2005 ZESCO (Zambia) 222 233 7,787 488 513 17,148 220 3 3 95
2005 ZESA (Zimbabwe) 177 158 9,443 531 475 28,343 300 2 2 112
2005 MEAN 381 401 199 481 507 12,561 126 4 4 95
 Note: L: Labor; S: Sales; G: Generation; C. Customer; K: Capacity. 
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The main problem with Table 3 is that it tells too wide a range of stories to allow a clear guide 
for policy-makers or decision-makers. The performance ranking based on these partial indicators 
changes too significantly according the criteria considered to provide relevant guidance on the actual 
performance of the sector. The partial correlation between these criteria varies from (-0.9) to (0.9). A 
measure able to reflect various criteria of interest jointly is thus needed. Possible such measures are 
discussed in the next section. Ideally, this measure should also allow a policymaker to inform the 
assessments made in the context of tariff revisions since efficiency gains need to be shared at some 
point with the users through tariff reductions.  
6.  So…how well did electricity companies perform in Southern Africa? 
While this section tries to provide a more robust sense of the evolution of the performance than 
the one that could be generated from the partial indicators, its more specific purpose is to assess the 
current performance level and the evolution of this performance since reforms started in the region. It 
summarizes the results on the achievements of the last 8 years or so, on how much scope for 
performance improvement there is, and on the potential sources of improvements. 
6.1. A broad view of what has changed in the efficiency performance  
To get a sense of the progress achieved, we calculate a very basic non-parametric frontier for the two 
most distant years available in the data base, 1998 and 2005. This allows us to get a comparative 
assessment within period of the changes in the sources of technical and scale inefficiency with which 
firms operate. We adopt an input oriented DEA. We then conduct an assessment of the performance of 
the firms across periods. We used on the DEA estimation the computer program DEAP Version 2.1 
(Coelli, 1996). 
To control for the heterogeneity of the firms, we first calculate a model which considers the 
multioutput nature of the business and accounts for generation and number of clients jointly. This is 
model 1. To get a fuller picture of the evolution, we also calculate three other models. Each of these 
models relies on the same inputs (labour and capital) as the basic model. They all differ from this basic 
model through the choice of the output variable. Generation is used for model 2, number of clients for 
model 3 and sales for model 416. The results are summarized in Table 4. 
For each model, we compare the results under the two usual assumptions for returns to scale: 
constant (CRS) and variable (VRS). The VRS approach is probably the most appropriate here in view 
of the wide range of operators’ sizes covered by our sample in a sector not typically characterized by 
constant returns to scale. The results for the CRS model seem to confirm this intuition. Indeed, under 
CRS, the operators appear to be less efficient. This is to a large extent due to the implicit assumption 
on the existence of an optimal size operator.  
The models yield firms specific results which are then aggregated and averaged for the region. 
The firm specific information is less interesting because more predictable. Indeed, Eskom is on the 
frontier and firms who cater mostly to large clients (bulk suppliers) tend to be quite efficient in terms 
of generation or sales and quite inefficient when measured in terms of customers. This is the case for 
NamPower for instance  
The computations reported in Table 4 suggest that the average efficiency levels are very similar 
                                                          
16 Note that tried also to combine generation and sales as output but the results are not reported here simply 
because they are very similar the results obtained from Model 1 combining generation and customers as outputs.  
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in any given year for each output when outputs are considered one at the time, although the average 
technical efficiency (generation) is somewhat lower than the commercial one (customers or sales).  
The average efficiency level is however higher when the commercial and the technical outputs are 
considered jointly (model 1). Overall these efficiency levels show a significant scope for 
improvement.  For single output models, depending on the output definition chosen, technical 
efficiency under VRS varied between 67% and 78% in 2005. When two outputs are considered, the 
scope for improvement somewhat shrinks as expected since the efficiency measure accounts for the 
fact that the operators are delivering more outputs with the same set of inputs.  
It is useful to not that Table 4 shows that the scope for significant additional improvements in 
terms of scale efficiency (SE) is much more limited than for technical efficiency whatever the output 
measure considered.  The table also shows that when multiple outputs are considered, the scope for 
improvements in SE are much lower, confirming the need to consider the multi-product nature of the 
business when assessing performance. However, in this case also, there is a difference between the 
technical and the commercial dimension of the business.  
Table 4: Average Efficiency levels in 1998 and 2005 
Average for  SAPP’s firms  1998 2005 
Outputs 
TTE 
(CRS) TE (VRS) SE 
TTE 
(CRS) TE (VRS) SE 
Generation and customers. 
Model 1 
0.858 
(0.186) 
0.878 
(0.189) 
0.977 
(0.025) 
0.834 
(0.183) 
0.874 
(0.175) 
0.955 
(0.079) 
Generation. Model 2 0.668 (0.269) 
0.736 
(0.273) 
0.904 
(0.143) 
0.695 
(0.292) 
0.778 
(0.243) 
0.873 
(0.251) 
Customers. Model 3 0.670 (0.274) 
0.774 
(0.247) 
0.847 
(0.252) 
0.678 
(0.305) 
0.763 
(0.258) 
0.872 
(0.272) 
Sales. Model 4 0.616 (0.314) 
0.690 
(0.345) 
0.904 
(0.120) 
0.590 
(0.330) 
0.671 
(0.352) 
0.904 
(0.165) 
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis 
6.2. A more thorough examination of the efficiency performance 
While the static comparison offered in section 6.1 is informative, it tells a very partial story, in 
particular with respect to the dynamics of the evolution of the performance. As always, the availability 
of data proved to be the main constraint in trying to figure out how much the operator’s performance 
improved between 1998 and 2005. However, the integration of data collected from various sources 
allowed us to generate a complete dataset covering every year between 1998 and 2005. This dataset 
generates additional insights on the evolution of performance and of the main components of this 
performance. As explained in section 3, we do so from a Malmquist index, adopting an input oriented 
DEA to decompose it into its various components, since in all of these countries the industry is 
regulated.  
We follow the same typology of outputs as in section 6.1 with the same two inputs. The results 
of our four basic models are shown in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 focuses on the index measures for 
physical measures of output (generation and customers), Table 6 focuses on our financial measure of 
output (sales). Following equations (5) and (7), each table shows the average change in TFP (TFPC) as 
well as its components, the Total Technical Efficiency Change (TTEC) and Technological Change 
(TC). The TTEC is also decomposed in Technical Efficiency Change (TEC) and Scale Efficiency 
Change (SEC).  
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Table 5: Malmquist Index 
 
OUTPUT: Generation and Customers 
INPUTS: Capital and Labour 
Model 1 
OUTPUT: Generation 
INPUTS: Capital and Labour 
Model 2 
OUTPUT: Customers 
INPUTS: Capital and Labour 
Model 3 
Firm TTEC TC TEC SEC TFPC TTEC TC TEC SEC TFPC TTEC TC TEC SEC TFPC 
ENE (Angola) 1.028 1.031 1.029 0.999 1.060 1.069 1.003 1.069 1 1.072 0.954 1.081 0.951 1.003 1.031 
BPC 
(Botswana) 1 1.058 1 1 1.058 1 0.999 1 1 0.999 1.04 1.074 1.036 1.003 1.116 
SNEL  
(DCR) 0.979 1.084 0.986 0.994 1.062 1.064 1.01 1.066 0.999 1.075 0.971 1.082 0.971 1 1.051 
LEC  
(Lesotho) 1 1.062 1 1 1.062 0.999 0.999 1 0.999 0.998 1.019 1.080 1 1.019 1.101 
ESCOM 
(Malawi) 0.982 1.067 0.988 0.994 1.048 0.988 0.995 0.991 0.997 0.983 1.001 1.082 0.998 1.003 1.083 
EdM 
(Mozambique) 1 1.074 1 1 1.074 0.767 0.995 0.947 0.810 0.763 1 1.076 1 1 1.076 
NamPower 
(Namibia) 1.018 1.02 1.014 1.004 1.037 0.974 1.007 1.013 0.962 0.981 0.965 1.083 1.017 0.949 1.045 
ESKOM 
(South Africa) 1 1.057 1 1 1.057 1 1.046 1 1 1.046 1 1.085 1 1 1.085 
SEB 
(Swaziland) 0.959 1.072 1 0.959 1.028 1.072 1.002 1 1.072 1.074 0.978 1.091 1 0.978 1.067 
TANESCO 
(Tanzania) 1.008 1.047 1 1.008 1.055 1.109 0.991 1.088 1.019 1.099 1.031 1.051 1 1.031 1.084 
ZESCO 
(Zambia) 0.992 1.040 0.992 0.999 1.031 1.006 1.010 1 1.006 1.015 1.009 1.081 1.009 1.001 1.092 
ZESA 
(Zimbabwe) 0.991 1.074 0.993 0.999 1.065 1.050 1.007 1.04 1.009 1.057 0.983 1.080 0.972 1.011 1.061 
                
MEAN 
0.996 1.057 1 0.996 1.053 1.004 1.005 1.017 0.987 1.010 0.996 1.079 0.996 1 1.074 
 
The story emerging from the efficiency calculations conducted with physical data (Table 5) may 
not be as straightforward as one could have wished for. Based on a very basic correlation of 
performance and market structure or institutional characteristics, whatever the performance model 
considered, there is no clear advantage in terms of the existence of a private actor or not, in terms of 
the degree of dependence on hydro source, in terms of the degree of vertical integration or in terms of 
the existence of an independent regulator.  
Note that the changes in productivity as provided by the mean calculated for each model shows 
some degree of consistency across models in terms of the global trend but also degree of divergence in 
terms of the specific performance ranking.  Under all models, the changes in productivity have been 
positive. In other words, considered jointly the two inputs have managed to deliver more over time, 
whatever the outcome indicator considered. However, the range of productivity gains is quite wide, 
spreading on a scale of 1 to 7. It varied from 1% (or 0.14% per year) when the output is generation to 
7.4% (or 1.06% per year) when the output is clients.  
The overall performance of the assessment is however at least more focused than the one 
emerging from the partial indicators discussed earlier.  For instance, the commercial (number of 
customers) and the technical indicators (generation) will not tell necessarily generate the same 
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performance ranking since operators can use their resources (i.e. inputs) to emphasize either (output) 
dimensions in their business. The preferred model should thus be the one which addresses jointly the 
two sides of the business. In other words, the best model in this paper is the one that looks at both 
dimensions of outputs and both inputs jointly. With that model (the first set of columns in Table 5), we 
find an average improvement in total economic efficiency of 5.3%. as indicated by the mean for the 
sample of operators covered here. Only Zambia, Swaziland, Namibia and Malawi are below that total 
average performance.  
While the overall trend is thus positive, it is also important to figure out the drivers of this 
positive trend. It turns out that this may be the most important observation since the results suggest 
that it is essentially driven by the technological change observed in the sector (i.e a frontier shift). 
With the exception of Namibia and to a lesser extent Angola and Tanzania, performance has hardly 
improves in terms of technical efficiency or scale economy which means that there is no catching up 
that is taking place in the management of the industry in the region.  
At the operator level, there are thus some clear winners and losers from the changes in 
productivity and this assessment is largely although not always independent of the criteria relied upon 
to assess efficiency. Some of the countries have made very significant improvements such as, South 
Africa, with gains during the period well above the average for all models or above the average for 
some models but always with positive increase in the TFP like Tanzania and Zambia. Some of the 
countries have also suffered a drop in performance, at least in terms of some specific outputs as is the 
case for Mozambique and Namibia. The ranking is however not totally insensitive to the criteria used. 
Some operators have on average achieved significant gains in terms of the number of clients they 
serve, while they did not achieve gains in terms of production like Mozambique. This implies that 
operators have allocated a large share of their efforts to improving their ability to increase their 
coverage of clients. It may also reflect a policy aimed at reducing commercial losses from illegal 
connections. This allows the operators to meet a larger demand for a given production level.  
Table 6 summarizes an assessment in terms of the financial performance of the operator by 
focusing on the drivers of the evolution of efficiency in terms of sales. Once more the average 
performance has seen an improvement by a 3.9% in efficiency over the full period of analysis but not 
all operators have been equally successful. The laggards include Lesotho, Malawi and Zimbabwe. As 
we found in terms of the physical performance indicators, the sources of the gains come improvement 
in technology rather than in terms of improved management or scale economies to catch up with best 
practice operators. In fact some operators (i.e. DCR, Lesotho, Zambia and Zimbabwe) have seen some 
significant declines in scale economies.   
Overall, in the context under analysis here, the time span between 1998 and 2005 is probably 
too brief to be able to notice major significant changes from major investment in generation, in 
particular in a region in which most of the expansion is expected to come from the hydro side. The 
high technological thus seems to be the major contribution of the changes of the 1990s. There is also a 
sense that the ability to commercialize the services has improved significantly since efficiency has 
improved significantly both in terms of customers and sales. Both may be the product of the 
significant efforts made to improve access to the existing networks in that region, although the very 
models scale efficiency gains may suggest that this is not the case or at least that added populations are 
not really that close in location to the existing populations. Our data does not allow us to be more 
assertive on this explanation. 
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Table 6.  Malmquist Index 
 
OUTPUT: Sales 
INPUTS: Capital and Labour 
Model 4 
 Period 1998-2005 
Firm TTEC TC TEC SEC TFPC 
ENE (Angola) 0.996 1.048 0.991 1.005 1.044
BPC (Botswana) 1.016 1.047 1 1.016 1.064
SNEL (DCR) 0.987 1.053 0.999 0.988 1.040
LEC (Lesotho) 0.957 1.047 1 0.957 1.002
ESCOM (Malawi) 0.968 1.045 0.974 0.994 1.012
EdM (Mozambique) 1.005 1.041 1 1.005 1.046
NamPower (Namibia) 1.013 1.053 1.004 1.009 1.067
ESKOM (South Africa) 1 1.044 1 1 1.044
SEB (Swaziland) 0.997 1.037 1 0.997 1.033
TANESCO (Tanzania) 1.015 1.047 0.973 1.043 1.063
ZESCO (Zambia) 0.985 1.053 0.999 0.986 1.037
ZESA (Zimbabwe) 0.964 1.052 0.982 0.981 1.014
 
MEAN 0.992 1.047 0.994 0.998 1.039
 
7. Concluding comments 
The analysis presented leaves a somewhat sweet and sour taste. The “sweet taste” stems from 
the mere possibility of a first efficiency diagnostic which reduces the very noisy information generated 
by partial indicators in terms of absolute and relative performance assessment. The analysis indeed 
provides a relatively robust set of results. It shows much more clearly than the partial indicators 
analysis could that the major improvements in the sample countries covered here can be assigned to 
two very clear sources: the adoption of better technologies and the improvements in commercial 
practices. It also shows that no significant improvements have been observed on the technical side. In 
more concrete terms, this can be interpreted as follows. The combination of labor and capital has not 
been used more effectively to generate more electricity (i.e. no change in technical efficiency and 
hence no catching up with best practice in management of the business) but the technological 
opportunities have been better internalized to increase the volume of electricity generated 
(technological improvements) and the ability to reach more customers and sell more has improved 
significantly over a 6 year period. This is quite consistent with what is typically expected from reforms 
of the kind adopted in the region and aimed at commercializing the electricity sector.      
The sour taste stems from several sources. The first is that while the reforms seem to have 
achieved some success, there is still some way to go. The results suggest that it is still to early to tell a 
very clear story on what specific market structure or institutional characteristic works best. The 
potential for performance improvements in the region continues however to be high.  The second is 
linked to the doubts that linger any time data quality and volume is so limited. The third is that, given 
the data limitations, the regulators of the sector in the region are likely to have a hard time 
coordinating directly the evolution of tariffs to the evolution of the efficiency performance.  Much 
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more data is needed, in particular on the cost side of the business, to achieve any fair decision on this 
front. Until this is done, “cost-plus” is likely to continue to be the de-facto regulatory regime. This 
means that the opportunities to implement incentive based regulation are likely to continue to be 
limited. It also means that the gains from reforms may simply become long lasting rents for the 
operators. The current users are not necessarily going to see much of these gains transformed into 
lower prices and the users for which service is currently not available or not affordable may not be 
able to see much improvement in their fate. Probably more so than in most of the other parts of the 
world, it is essential to ensure equitable access to ensure that efficiency is tracked properly.  
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